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The EuropeanCommission and pharmaceutical policy
A victory for profits over public health?
Martin McKee professor of European public health 1, Paul Belcher strategic adviser to the president
and board 2
1London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine; 2European Public Health Alliance
News of the allocation by the European Commission’s president
elect, Jean-Claude Juncker, of portfolios to the remaining
European Commissioners has been eagerly awaited. This is an
intensely political process, with the largest member states vying
among themselves for the main economic roles.Would Juncker
follow established precedent, giving health a low priority by
allocating the portfolio to one of the countries with the smallest
economies and thus, in effect, least political power in the
European Union? This process had seen responsibility transfer,
after European Union enlargement, from Ireland to Cyprus and
then Malta. Or would he break with precedent and allocate it
on the basis of merit, choosing the commissioner whose
expertise and experience most closely matched the role?
This time it seemed at least possible that Juncker would choose
the second course, given that the line up included a very
experienced candidate, Vytenis Andriukaitis, a Lithuanian
surgeon who had been active in his country’s struggle for
independence and gone on to become a successful health
minister. European health policy experts were delighted when
Juncker chose this course; subject to approval by the European
Parliament, Andriukaitis will take up his role in November 2014.
Yet very shortly afterwards it became clear that the news was
not all that it seemed. The allocation of jobs was accompanied
by a restructuring of the directorates general (DGs)—in effect
the ministries of the European Commission—without any
explanation for the change. Three of the key units within the
directorate general for health and consumers (DG SANCO)
were to be transferred to the directorate general for the internal
market, industry, and entrepreneurship (DGENTR). These were
the units responsible for medicinal products andmedical devices,
including authorisations; that for quality, safety and efficacy;
and the European Medicines Agency.
This move reversed changes made by the previous European
Union president, JoséManuel Barroso, who in 2009 had brought
these responsibilities within DG SANCO after a campaign led
by pan-European health and consumer groups.1Then, DGENTR
was seen as unable to provide the necessary leadership in the
face of H1N1 influenza, especially in respect to emergency
preparedness. The 2009 reorganisation also reflected a
recognition of the need to harmonise the European
Commission’s structures with those of its member states, where
policies on pharmaceutical quality and safety were typically led
by health ministries.
Inevitably, the latest change has provoked a furious response
among health policy experts. Peggy Maguire, president of the
European Public Health Alliance, described it as a “potential
disaster,” arguing that Juncker was placing health concerns in
“second place to appeasing big business.”2 In the same vein
Monique Goyens, director general of the European Consumer
Organization, said, “This shift gives European consumers the
signal that economic interests come before their health.”2 In
contrast, the body representing the European drug industry was
delighted. Richard Bergstrom, director general of the European
Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations,
welcomed the move, expressing his “trust [that] the people in
these units have the integrity to continue to put patient safety
first.”3
Critics of the transfer have three main objections. The first, and
perhaps the most important at a time when the failures of the
current model of pharmaceutical discovery and development
have been unfolding in the glare of publicity surrounding the
Ebola outbreak,4 is the question of how DG SANCO will be
able to fulfil its mandates in respect of preparedness for
infectious diseases, such as pandemic flu, and biological or
chemical terrorism. One of themain components of any response
will be the authorisation, monitoring, and allocation of drugs,
which will now lie with the DG responsible for industry, whose
mandate is to promote the competitiveness of the drug industry.
In these circumstances there is a danger that commercial
interests will trump health security.
The second concern relates to the best way to create incentives
to bring new drugs to market. Some measures have focused on
enhanced protection of intellectual property rights and thus the
industry’s profits. One example is howmanufacturers have been
rewarded for seeking approval to use their products in children,
thereby avoiding potentially hazardous off-label prescribing,
by being given extended patent life. The goal was certainly
laudable, but its success has been questionable.5 New
Correspondence to: M McKee martin.mckee@lshtm.ac.uk
For personal use only: See rights and reprints http://www.bmj.com/permissions Subscribe: http://www.bmj.com/subscribe
BMJ 2014;349:g5671 doi: 10.1136/bmj.g5671 (Published 15 September 2014) Page 1 of 2
Editorials
EDITORIALS
mechanisms are certainly needed, but again they must balance
the interests of the industry and the public, and the question is
who is best placed to do this.
A third concern relates to the secrecy of the drug authorisation
process, as described in great detail by Ben Goldacre in his book
Bad Pharma.6 Glenis Willmott, a British member of the
European Parliament, recalled, “When I was negotiating the
transparency laws for clinical trial results, it was DG Enterprise
that wanted to water the rules down. Now they will be
overseeing the European Medicines Agency as it implements
the transparency regime, which is frankly concerning.”2
A final concern, albeit one less openly voiced, relates to the
challenge of transferring these responsibilities to a directorate
general that is headed by a nominee of the Polish government,
which has demonstrated its willingness to place corporate
interests above those of public health in its opposition to tobacco
control measures,7 even to the extent of over-ruling its health
minister. In this respect Poland is rapidly assuming the role of
the tobacco industry’s best friend in Europe, a role previously
held by Germany.8 There have also been concerns about
apparently close ties between the pharmaceutical and medical
technology industries and Polish regulators.9 10
Recent national and European elections revealed a combination
of disillusionment and outright hostility to the European idea.
Taking responsibility for medicines from those charged with
safeguarding public health and giving it to those whose goal is
to support an industry whose track record is decidedly mixed
seems a strange way to improve this situation.
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